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he question of the Famine-Genocide of 1932-
1933 will remain at the center of heated social 
and political debate in Ukraine for some time to 
come. This is a matter not only of deeply traumatized 
memories and a wholly understandable yearning to 
smash the wall of silence built up over the decades 
by the Communist regime about this terrible human 
catastrophe. The significance of the Holodomor issue 
lies in the fact that the manner of its perception allows 
one to clarify Ukraine's place in a temporal matrix of 
“past—present—future,” to be aware of the importance 
of safeguarding the state independence of Ukraine, as 
well as her professing to democratic values and to the 
fact that there is no alternative to a European path for her 
development.
While defending the academic principle of distancing 
historical study from politics and rejecting a didactic 
role for history, one cannot argue against the weighty 
role of historians in influencing how society imagines 
its own past. By the same token, one cannot deny 
social influences on the process of “creating historical 
scholarship.” The aim of this article is to analyze the 
evolution of research on the Famine of 1932-1933 in 
Ukraine over an extended period of time, beginning in 
the 1930s and ending in the present day.
I will examine the complicated path followed by 
Ukrainian historical scholarship—from the denial of 
the very fact of the Holodomor under the Soviet policy 
of “imposed amnesia” to its acknowledgment and the 
identification of this crime as an act of genocide on the 
part of the Soviet regime. In fact, today a large number 
of professional historians realize the importance of 
researching the Soviet collectivization of agriculture and 
the Famine through the prism of a simultaneous analysis 
of socio-economic, political, ideological, and nationality 
issues. This should be viewed as an undeniable 
achievement.
Nevertheless, some negative trends also affect 
contemporary Holodomor studies, including a lingering 
closed-mindedness among Ukrainian historians, who 
tend to participate anemically in the sorts of scholarly
discussions on the matter taking place in the West. 
Moreover, there are obvious signs of the issue's 
politicization, manifested by the presence of Communist 
and anti-Semitic interpretations of the Holodomor in the 
field of historical writing in contemporary Ukraine.
Holodomor Historiography to 1991
In order to better appreciate the development of the 
historiography of the Holodomor, it is useful for one to 
have an idea of how the matter had been dealt with in 
Soviet times.
The earliest treatments of the Famine basically 
involved its total denial—an “imposed amnesia,” if 
you will—which enabled an obliterative celebration 
of the gains of socialism in the Soviet countryside in 
the early 1930s. These were “codified” in 1938 in the
Short Course of the History of the Communist Party 
(Bolshevik) of the Soviet Union.1 Rather than providing 
a truthfully apocalyptic account of the horrors that took 
place in the countryside, these accounts painted a picture 
of the victorious strides made by the regime towards the 
establishment of a happy and prosperous rural life. For 
several decades thereafter, the political and ideological 
concepts of the Short Course remained the norm 
throughout the USSR, including the Ukrainian SSR.2
However, notwithstanding the Stalinist regime's 
repressive and punitive actions, as well as its pervasive
1. Istoriia VsesoiuznoiKomunistychnoipartii (bil'shovykiv).
Korotkyi kurs (Kyiv, 1938).
2. For example, see the dissertation synopses (“avtoreferaty”)
M. I. Tsapko, “Bor'ba bol'shevikov Khar'kovschiny za kollektivizatsi- 
iu sel'skogo khoziaistva (1928-1932)” (Kyiv, 1952); A. P Iaroshenko, 
“Bor'ba komitetov nezamozhnykh selian Ukrainy pod rukovodstvom 
bol'shevistskoi partii za kollektivizatsiiu sel'skogo khoziaistva (1929-
1930)” (Lviv, 1952); and S. N. Ioffe, “Bor'ba Kommunisticheskoi 
partii za kollektivizatsiiu sel'skogo khoziaistva (1928-1934): Na ma- 
terialakh Chernigovskoi oblasti” (Kyiv, 1953) as well as D. F. Virnyk 
et al, eds., Narysy rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva Ukrains’koi 
RSR (Kyiv, 1949); Sergei Trapeznikov, Bor'ba partii bol'shevikov za 
kollektivizatsiiu sel'skogo khoziaistva v gody pervoi stalinskoi piati- 
letki (Moscow, 1951); and Diadichenko et al, eds., Istoriia Ukrainskoi 
SSR, vol. 2 (Kyiv: Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, 1956), 
358 and passim.
propaganda, memories of the Famine of 1932-1933 
never faded in Ukraine, particularly at the level of social 
consciousness.
During the brief period of the Thaw under Nikita 
Khrushchev, the problems involved in the collectivization 
of agriculture could be alluded to,3 but the subject of the 
Famine remained prohibited in public discourse. This 
is hardly surprising: the criticism of Stalin's cult of 
personality, initiated by the ruling Communist Party, had 
clear ideological limits, and it could certainly not extend 
to the existing system of authority. In this context, the 
subject of the Ukrainian Famine remained “politically 
dangerous”: the open recognition of the millions of 
deaths during the Famine could not only potentially 
undermine the effectiveness of the Communist regime, 
but also its legitimacy. Sensitive to this issue, in the 
early days of the Brezhnev era Bolshevik ideologists 
re-imposed a strict information embargo. The so-called 
“liberal interpretations” of “food stocks problems” in 
early 1933 made by historians at the time of the Thaw 
were “corrected” and suppressed.4
Soviet authorities also tried to maintain an 
informational blockade abroad, but various organizations 
in the Ukrainian diaspora constantly “hindered” these 
efforts, and sought for decades to direct world attention 
to the crimes committed by Stalin and his totalitarian 
regime. The success of the Ukrainian diaspora in 
attracting public attention to the issue of the Famine 
during the commemoration of its fiftieth anniversary in 
the early 1980s5 and the continued action on the part of 
diaspora Ukrainians and Western scholars6—particularly 
the work of the U.S. Commission on the Ukraine 
Famine—compelled the Soviet authorities, on the eve 
of the release of the Commission's preliminary results, 
to reconsider their total ban on mentioning the Famine. 
This led to the publication of some cautious articles. 
The first appeared in the November 1987 issue of the 
theoretical journal of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union's Central Committee, Kommunist.7 It suggested
3. Istoriia Ukrainskoi SSR, vol. 2 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 
1969), 295.
4. Ocherki istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy, 4th rev ed 
(Kyiv: Political Literature Publishing House of Ukraine, 1977), 459 
and 472.
5. Dzheims Meis [James Mace], “Vidznachennia ukrai'ns'koiu
diasporoiu 50-richchia holodomoru,” in Holod 1932-1933 rokiv v
Ukraini: prychyny ta naslidky, eds. V. A. Smolii and V. M. Lytvyn
(Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2003), 796-800.
6. Robert Conquest, Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization 
and the Terror-Famine (London: Hutchinson, 1986); Roman Serbyn 
and Bohdan Krawchenko, eds., Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933 (Ed-
monton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1986); and Dzeims 
Meis, “Diial'nist' Komisii' Kongresu SShA z vyvchennia holodu v 
Ukraini,” in Holod 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini: prychyny ta naslidky, 
eds. V. A. Smolii and V. M. Lytvyn (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2003).
7. V. Danilov, “Oktiabr' i agrarnaia politika partii,” Kommunist,
16 (1314) (1987): 29-38. See also Danilov's article in the newspaper
a new “historical scheme,” acknowledged problems 
with agriculture in the late 1920s and early 1930s, and 
even mentioned the fact that a famine had occurred in 
1932-1933. This item was accompanied by an explicit 
statement that the fault for this lay not with the regime 
(i.e., the ruling Communist Party), but in “the breach of 
the principles of Lenin's cooperative plan” by Stalin. It 
also suggested that the Famine of 1932-1933 should be 
seen as a common disaster suffered by all Soviet people: 
“from Ukraine, the Don and the Kuban; to the Middle and 
Lower Volga region; and to the Southern Ural Mountains 
and Kazakhstan.”8
Of course, the decision by Communist authorities to 
stop denying the fact of the Famine was not simply the 
result of external pressure. The liberalization of social 
and political life in the USSR in the era of glasnost and 
perestroika also contributed significantly. This did not 
mean, however, that the authorities themselves were 
ready to pursue active research into the matter or to 
offer assistance to Westerners looking to investigate 
it further. Perestroika and glasnost notwithstanding, 
ordinary professional Soviet historians had no access to 
the necessary archival documents regarding the Famine; 
these records were opened only to a limited group of 
Party scholars who were considered reliable.
Throughout 1988 the leading all-Union and republi-
can Party and Soviet periodicals continued to publish 
material that reflected the official historical scheme of the 
events in the late 1920s and early 1930s.9 Nevertheless, 
there was a substantial growth in the number of authors, 
mainly journalists and other writers, who sought to present 
an alternative to the official interpretation of events by 
showing the tragedy in the way it was preserved in the 
people's memory. This task was primarily undertaken by 
the historical and educational organization Memorial, 
founded in 1988. One of its major projects, spearheaded 
by the late Volodymyr Maniak, was the publication of a 
Knyha-memorial (Book-Memorial) that would challenge 
the reigning policy of forgetfulness.10
All the same, the Communist Party expected 
to assume the role of ideological curator to scholars 
interpreting the “difficult chapters” of the historical past
Sovetskaia Rossia, 11 October 1987.
8. Ibid., 36.
9. V. P. Danilov, “Diskussiia v zapadnoi presse o golode 1932-
1933 i ‘demographicheskoi katastrofe' 30-40-kh godov v SSSR,” 
Voprosy istorii, no. 3 (1988): 116-121; V. P. Danilov, “Kollektivizat- 
sia: kak eto bylo/Besedu s zav. sektorom Instituta istorii SSSR AN 
SSSR zapisal A. Il'in,” Pravda, 26 August and 16 September 1988; S. 
V. Kul'chyts'kyi, “Do otsinky stanovyscha v sil's'komu hospodarstvi 
URSR u 1931-1933 rr., Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, no. 3 (324) 
(1988); S.V. Kul'chyts'kyi, “Trydtsiat' tretii,” Sil's'ki visti, 12 June 
1988.
10. V. Maniak, “Narodovi poveraiet'sia istoriia, a istorii—prav- 
da. Rozdumy nad rukopysom knyhy-memorialu ‘1933: Holod,”” 
Literaturna Ukraina, 27 July 1989.
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that had recently come out into the open. In January 1990, 
it instructed scholars and educators to start studying the 
Famine, Stalinist repressions and other problems “caused 
by the cult of personality and its consequences,” with 
the findings to be submitted “for the consideration of the 
Central Committee.”11 But the times had changed, and 
the Party's ideological grip over historians was becoming 
weaker and weaker.
The staging of a landmark international symposium
titled “The Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine” in 
September 1990, with scholars from the United States, 
Canada, Italy and West Germany also taking part, 
reflected the growing activity of non-Party bodies 
with regard to the issue.12 Interestingly enough, the 
publication of the Party-sponsored Holod 1932-1933 
rokiv na Ukraini: Ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv 
(The Famine 1932-1933 in Ukraine: Through the Eyes of 
Historians, in the Language of Documents) was formally 
approved on the first day of the symposium. When the 
book appeared in November 1990,13 many readers were 
shocked by its contents. At this point, Ukraine's Party 
leadership affirmed that the subject of the Famine had 
been “finally clarified” and was now “closed to public 
discussion.” Given the general indifference shown by 
the broader Ukrainian public to the matter, as well as 
vociferous criticisms mounted by neo-Stalinist elements 
of how collectivization and the Famine had been 
presented, initially it seemed that this might happen. 
Nevertheless, Famine research would continue.
The Famine of 1932-33 as Interpreted by
Today's Ukrainian Historians
After the declaration of Ukraine's independence, 
thanks to the resulting absence of ideological pressure 
and the new-found freedom of access to archival re-
sources, a number of Ukrainian researchers of the Fam-
ine of 1932-33 directed their energies towards creating 
a more comprehensive factographic map of the tragic 
events in Ukraine as a whole and at the regional level. 
And yet, there emerged a dominant tendency to regional-
ize research, as attested by numerous scholarly articles, 
dissertations, and monographs.14 The desire to provide a
11. Central State Archive of Public Organizations of Ukraine 
[TsDAHOU], f.1, op. 32, spr. 2859 ark. 29. The text of this missive
was published in Radians'ka Ukraina, 4 February 1990.
12. “Holodomor: bil' narodnyi,” Trybuna, no. 11 (1990); 
“Mizhnarodnyi simpozium ‘Holodomor 1932-1933 rokiv na Ukraini,' 
Kyiv, 5-7 veresnia 1990r.,” VisnykAkademi'i nauk Ukra'ins'koiRSR,
1 (1991).
13. F. M. Rudych, ed., and R. Ia. Pyrih, comp., Holod 1932-
1933 rokiv na Ukraini: ochyma istorikiv, movoiu documentiv (Kyiv: 
Political Literature Publishing House of Ukraine, 1990).
14. E. I. Kovalenko, “Golod 1932-1933 v Donbasse,” Letopis'
Donbassa (Donets'k, 1992), vyp. 1, 54-56; Ie. Iu. Iatsenko, “Stalinizm
i holod 1933 r. v Ukraini (na materialakh Slobozhanshchyny),”in
Totalitarizm i antitotalitarnye dvizheniia v Bolgarii, SSSR i drugikh
dramatic increase in documentary proof that a genocidal 
famine had taken place also prompted a series of works 
in which scholars adopted the role of commentators on 
published archival materials and eyewitness testimonies. 
Typical of these were 33: Holod: Narodna Knyha-Me- 
morial ([19]33: Famine: A People's Book-Memorial),15 
Chorna knyha Ukrainy (The Black Book of Ukraine)16 *
and others.
As scholarly analyses of the Holodomor probed 
ever deeper, it became increasingly apparent that the 
divisions (which emerged both in Ukraine and beyond 
its borders) between the proponents of “economic his-
tory” (those who sought to elucidate the reasons for and 
mechanisms of the occurrence of the Famine by way 
of a detailed analysis of Stalin's agrarian policy) and 
“political history” (those who focused primarily on the 
study of politico-ideological processes and the specifics 
of the nationalities policy in Stalin's “Revolution from 
Above”) were historiographically unproductive. How-
ever, the structuralist approach to historical processes, 
which involves the study of collectivization through the
stranakh Vostochnoi Evropy (20-30 gody XX veka) (Kharkiv, 1994). 
vol. 1, 223-230; S. V. Markova, Naseleni punkty Kam'ianechchyny 
v period holodomoru 1932-33 rokiv, in Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi 
State Pedagogical University, Naukovi pratsi, 1998, vol. 2 (4): 
Istorychni nauky, 191-194; N. Babych, “Dramatychni trydtsiati (do 
temy “Velykyi holod na Myrhorodshchyni 1932-33 rr.,” in Storinky 
istorii Myrhorodshchyny, vyp. 3 (Poltava 2002), 157-187; V. M. 
Zubkovs'kyi, “Holodomor 1932-1933 rr. na Zaporizhzhi,” Naukovi 
zapysky, vyp. 46: (istorychni nauky) (Kyiv-Berdians'k, 2002), 109-
113; and M. Sribniak, “Sumshchyna v umovakh holodomoru 1932-
1933,” Slovo Prosvity, 2005, no. 42 ff.
The following is a list of dissertations dealing with the Holodo- 
mor, each with is own 18-20 page synopsis published in the city in 
which it was completed: N. P. Romanets', “Selianstvo i radians'ka 
vlada u 1928-1933 rokakh: problema vzaiemovidnosyn (na material- 
akh Dnipropetrovs'koi oblasti)” (Dnipropetrovs'k University, 1995);
Ie. Iu. Iatsenko, “Holodomor 1932-33 na Kharkivshchyni” (Kharkiv 
State University, 1999); S. V. Markova, “Holodomor 1932-1933 na 
Podilli” (Chernivtsi National University, 2002); and A. M. Bakhtin, 
“Kolektyvizatsiia sil's'koho hospodarstva i holod na terytorii Pivdnia 
Ukrainy (1929-1933 roky)” (Kyiv Mohyla Academy National Univer-
sity, 2006).
I. H. Shul'ha, Holod na Podilli (Vinnytsia, 1993); B. I. 
Tkachenko, Pid chornym tavrom: Istorychna rozvidka pro henotsyd 
na Ukraini i, zokrema, na Lebedynshchyni v 1932-1933r., skriplena 
naivyshchym suddeiu—liuds'koiu pam'iattiu (Lebedyn, 1994); R.H. 
Nesterov, Trahichni roky na Myronivshchyni (1928-1932): Z litopysu 
ridnoho kraiu (Myronivka, 2000); I.V. Rybak, A. Iu Matvieiev, 
Trahichnyi perelom. Kolektyvizatsiia i rozkurkulennia na Podilli 
ta Pivdenno-Skhidnii Volyni (Kam'ianets'-Podil's'kyi, 2001); S.V. 
Markova, Holodomor 1932-1933 na Podilli (Kyiv, 2003); V. H. 
Akopian et al, Trahediia stolittia: holodomor 1932—933 rokiv na 
Mykolaivshchyni (Mykolaiv, 2003); L. D. Didorenko, Holodomor 
1932-1933 rr. na Krasnopil'shchyni (Sumy, 2003); and M. Shytiuk 
and A. Bakhtin, Pivdenna Ukraina: kolektyvizatsiia i holod (1929-
1933 roky) (Mykolaiv, 2007).
15. L. B. Kovalenko and V. A. Maniak, comps., 33: Holod: 
Narodna Knyha-Memorial (Kyiv, 1991).
16. F. Zubanych, comp., Chorna knyha Ukrainy: Zbirnyk 




prism of a simultaneous analysis of socio-economic, 
politico-ideological, and nationalities issues, provided a 
way of moving beyond the limitations and inadequacies 
of research caused by the abovementioned division.
A structuralist approach underpinned Holod 1932-
1933 rokiv v Ukraini: prychyny i naslidky (The Famine 
of 1932-33 in Ukraine: Causes and Effects, published 
by the Institute of the History of Ukraine.17 In its eleven 
chapters an array of scholars, most of whom were well 
known in the field in Ukraine, analyzed the socio-eco-
nomic, political and ethnonational aspects of the col-
lectivization of agriculture and the Holodomor, as well 
as the latter's demographic effects. Also examined were 
elements of the information blockade imposed on the 
subject; contemporary efforts to overcome this block-
ade by Ukrainian emigre political and community or-
ganizations; and the successful actions to this end by 
the Ukrainian diaspora, the U.S. Commission on the 
Ukraine Famine and the International Commission of In-
quiry into the 1932-33 Famine in Ukraine in the 1980s, 
among others. These articles were complemented by a 
study of extant sources, a historiographic study, and a 
bibliographic study.
The fracturing of Soviet-era intellectual isolation 
from the international scholarly historiographical com-
munity, as well as the ongoing study of archival sources 
and the memoirs of eyewitnesses, created the necessary 
conditions for the creation of new conceptual models 
appropriate to a deeper understanding of the complex 
dilemmas of the period of collectivization and famine, 
as well as for the establishment of a connection to the 
current period of Ukrainian history. The issue of the 
genocidal nature of the Famine of 1932-33 acquired a 
particular importance in this regard.
Russian historians have uniformly maintained that 
the description of the Famine as genocidal is juridically 
inaccurate and politically motivated, dismissing the term 
“Holodomor” as an ideologically tainted neologism. For 
their part, Western historians have expressed varying 
views on this issue, while those in Ukraine have for the 
most part been in agreement that “genocide” and “Ho- 
lodomor” are entirely appropriate terms for the events of 
1932-33. Opposition to these terms in Ukraine today is, 
as a rule, expressed by representatives of particular po-
litical forces outside the context of scholarly discussion.
The social significance of this issue has prompted 
scholars to focus on the adoption in 1948 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (commonly, the Genocide 
Convention) and the various definitions of the concept 
of “genocide.” This question was examined by George 
Grabowicz in the article “Holodomor i pam'iat' (The Ho-
17. V. M. Lytvyn and V. A. Smolii, eds., Holod 1932-1933 rokiv 
v Ukraini: prychyny i naslidky (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2003).
lodomor and Memory), published in the journal Krytyka 
in 2003.18 Grabowicz noted the particular political con-
ditions surrounding the adoption of the Convention (in-
cluding the demands by the USSR and the UK to exclude 
“political and other groups” from the definitional list of 
victims) and provided a sketch of the current scholarly 
discussion about the concept of genocide. The Harvard- 
based scholar also expressed his conviction that “more 
important than a basic and fixed juridical definition of 
the concept of genocide is the dynamic of its develop-
ment, its evolution during the course of the genocidal 
twentieth century, and its function in the future.”19
Current interpretations of the UN Convention of 
1948 in international jurisprudence were the subject of 
an analysis by Prof. Oleksii Haran' of the Kyiv Mohyla 
Academy, in his article “Recognition of the Holodo- 
mor as Genocide: A Problem of Interpretation or Politi-
cal Manipulation?”20 The author refers to material that 
appears on Prevent Genocide International's Web site 
(http://www.preventgenocide.org/) and pays particular 
attention to the differentiation by jurists between the 
concepts of “ethnic” and “national” groups as used in the 
Convention.21 Haran' stresses the consequent importance 
of “speaking of the genocide of the Ukrainian people, 
which includes representatives of other ethnic groups 
who also fell victim to the Holodomor.”22
Grounds for describing the Ukrainian Famine as 
genocide in politico-legal terms were presented by 
Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi in his monographs (in Ukrainian) 
Holod 1932-1933 rr. v Ukraini iak henotsyd (The 
Famine of 1932-1933 as Genocide) and (in Russian)
Pochemu on nas unichtozhal? Stalin i ukrainskii
Golodomor (Why did he annihilate us? Stalin and the 
Ukrainian Holodomor).23 Dr. Kul'chyts'kyi proceeded 
from what he maintains is the necessity of viewing the 
tragedy of the Holodomor in Ukraine not in ethnic but in 
national terms. “The Ukrainian people,” he emphasized, 
“should be understood not only as an ethnos, but also
18. Hryhorii Hrabovych, “Holodomor i pam'iat',” Krytyka, 12 
(2003).
19. Ibid.
20. A. Garan' “Priznanie Golodomora genotsidom: problema 
tolkovanii ili politicheskaia manipuliatsiia?,” Ukraina segodnia 
(online resource), 17 May 2007.
21. Notably the author puts forth a judicial definition of these 
concepts: “A national group means a set of individuals whose identity 
is defined by a common country of nationality or national origin”; “an 
ethnic group is a set of individuals whose identity is defined by com-
mon cultural traditions, language or heritage.”
22. Ibid.
23. S. Kul'chyts'kyi, Holod 1932-1933 rr. v Ukraini iak he- 
notsyd (Kyiv: National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine Instititute of 
History, 2005) and S. Kul'chitskii, Pochemu on nas unichtozhal? Sta-
lin i ukrainskii Golodomor (Kyiv: Ukrainskaia press grupa, 2007). In 
2008, this author published another work on the subject from a more 
strictly academic perspective; see S. Kul'chyts'kyi, Holod 1932-1933 
rr. iak henotsyd: trudnoshchi usvidomlennia (Kyiv: Nash chas, 2008).
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as a political nation, and Ukraine not only as a territory 
where Ukrainians live, but also as a country. If we adopt 
this approach to the events of 1932-33, then we should 
recognize that the genocide was a terror campaign 
with famine as a means, directed at Ukrainians in the 
Ukrainian SSR and the Kuban region under the guise of 
a grain procurement operation.”24
Dr. Kul'chyts'kyi was also drawn to the constructive 
ideas of Terry Martin about a “national interpretation 
of the Holodomor,”25 and of Andrea Graziosi about 
the differences that distinguish various instances of 
starvation in 1931-33 in the USSR as a whole, the Kazakh 
famine and epidemics of 1931-33, and the Ukraino- 
Kuban Holodomor of late 1932 and early 1933.26 In his 
development of these concepts, Kul'chyts'kyi attempts 
to integrate the events of the Famine in Ukraine with 
the general context of the Communist Revolution of 
1918-38, and thus sets apart those events/elements, 
which were common to the overall Soviet and specific 
Ukrainian situations.27 In so doing, he also highlights 
those phenomena which were unique to Ukraine and the 
Kuban region in late 1932 and early 1933, in particular 
the massive number of deaths caused by the confiscation 
of all foodstuffs, not only grain, from the peasants of 
these territories.28
In examining the Famine-Genocide through the 
prism of analysis of the functioning of the Ukrainian 
SSR as a state entity (albeit a de facto state with limited 
jurisdiction), Kul'chyts'kyi makes the fate of the various 
ethnic groups of which the republic's population was 
comprised an important consideration. Research of 
this topic in Ukraine is only now beginning to gain 
momentum, for example, the series of scholarly articles 
published on the impact of the Famine on Ukraine's 
Germans and Jews.29 This issue has also been examined 
as part of more general overviews of the life of one 
or another of the republic's ethnic communities in the 
1920s and 1930s.30
24. S. Kul'chyts'kyi, Holod 1932-1933 rr. v Ukraini iak he- 
notsyd (Kyiv: Institute of the History of Ukraine, 2005).
25. Teri Martin [Terry Martin], “Pro kozhnoho z nas dumaie 
Stalin,” Krytyka, 12 (2003).
26. A. Gratsiozi [A. Graziosi], “Holod u SRSR 1931-1933 rr. ta 
ukrains'kyi holodomor,” Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 3 (2005).
27. S. Kul'chitskii, Pochemu on nas unichtozhal? Stalin i 
ukrainskii Golodomor (Kyiv, 2007), 90-91.
28. Ibid., 86, 97-101. The author's thoughts on this matter are 
expressed more succinctly in his Holod 1932-1933 rr. v Ukraini iak 
henotsyd (Kyiv, 2005), 314.
29. V. V. Ivanenko, “Golod nachala 30-ykh godov i sud'ba 
nemetskikh kolonistov,” Voprosy germanskoi istorii (Dnipropetrovs'k, 
1996), 150-157; A .I. Beznosov, “Mennonity iuga Ukrainy v gody 
‘velikogo pereloma' (1928-33 gg.)” Voprosy germanskoi istorii 
(Dnipropetrovs'k, 2001), 75-88; Ia. S. Khonihsman, “Kolektyvizat- 
siia, holodomor, i zanepad ievreis'koho zemlerobstva v Ukraini,” 
Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 2-3 (2004): 66-75 and passim.
30. The dissertations, each with a short published synopsis,
Closely related to the matter of ascertaining the 
genocidal nature of the events of 1932-33 is the problem 
of establishing the motive and intentions of those who 
caused the Holodomor. Although most Ukrainian 
researchers agree that the Famine was caused by the 
large-scale political and socio-economic experimentation 
conducted by the Stalinist authorities, and more directly, 
by the confiscation of foodstuffs and the blockade of those 
regions afflicted by starvation, the country's scholars 
are nevertheless divided on their interpretation of the 
motives for such actions. Some emphasize Stalin's desire 
to destroy the economic independence of the peasantry 
and force them onto collective farms31; others believe 
that eliminating the Ukrainian national movement's 
base of support and neutralizing the threat of “Ukrainian 
separatism” to be of primary importance32; and still others 
(this approach is gaining wider acceptance) propose 
that a combination of social and national motives stood 
behind the actions of the Stalinist leadership.33
Another important aspect of assessing the regime's 
motives is the examination of the threats perceived by 
the Communist authorities (real or imagined), as well as 
the determination of whether a close connection can be 
made between Stalin's urge to eliminate such threats and 
the Holodomor. In this respect, the studies of the forms 
and the scale of the Ukrainian population's opposition 
to forcible collectivization, published by Valerii Vasl'iev, 
Oksana Hanzha, and Kul'chyts'kyi,34 as well as those
include N. V. Ostasheva, “Kryza menonits'koi spil'noty ta zakor- 
donna menonits'ka dopomoha (1914-poch. 30-kh rr. XX st.)” 
(Dnipropetrovs'k, 1996); V .O. Dotsenko, “Ievreis'ke hromads'ke 
zemleoblashtuvannia v Ukraini (20-ti-30-ti roky XX stolittia)” (Kyiv, 
2005); L. L. Misinskevych, “Natsional'ni menshyny Podillia v 20-30- 
kh rr. XX stolittia” (Kyiv, 2000); and others.
31. I. H. Shul'ha, Holod na Podilli (Vinnytsia, 1993); M. M. 
Shytiuk, Nasyl'nyts'ka kolektyvizatsiia sil's'koho hospodarstva iak 
odna z holovnykh prychyn holodu 1932—1933 rokiv; and Holod-genot- 
syd 1932—33 rokiv na terytorii Mykolaivshchyny: pohliady istorykiv, 
ochevydtsiv, arkhivni materialy (Mykolaiv, 2003), 33-44, 50-67.
32. V. I. Ulianych, Teror holodom i povstans'ka borot'ba proty 
henotsydu ukraintsiv u 1921—1933 rokakh (Kyiv, 2004).
33. Holod 1932-1933 rokiv v Ukraini: prychyny i naslidky 
(Kyiv, 2003); S. Kul'chitskii, Pochemu on nas unichtozhal? Stalin 
i ukrainskii Golodomor (Kyiv, 2007); and others. Professor Simon 
Gerhard of the University of Cologne provides some perspective on 
this approach when he rightfully notes that from the point of view of 
Stalin regime “both the economically independent peasant and the na-
tionally conscious Ukrainian were enemies and had to be humbled.” 
See Gerhard's “Chy buv holodomor 1932-1933 rr. instrumentom 
‘likvidatsii ukrains'koho natsionalizmu'?” Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi 
zhurnal, 2 (2005): 118.
34. V. Vasil'iev. “Krestianskie vosstania na Ukraine 1929-
1930 rr.,” Svobodnaia mysl', 9 (1992); V. Vasil'ev; L. Viola, 
Kollektivizatsiia i krest'ianskoe soprotivlenie na Ukraine: noiabr' 
1929-mart 1930 g.g. (Vinnytsia, 1997); V. Shkvarchuk, “Zhino- 
chyi bunt [19 serpnia 1932 roku]: (Za materialamy ‘Sprava No. 
1947/26483' Kyivs'koho oblviddilu DPU,” Siverians'kyi lito- 
pys, 4 (1996); O. I. Hanzha, “Opir selianstva politytsi sutsil'noi 
kolektyvizatsii v Ukraini,” Problemy istorii Ukrainy: fakty, sud- 
zhennia, poshuky, 2001, vyp. 4; S. Kul'chyts'kyi (in addition to his
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by James Mace, Nikolai Ivanitskii, and Lynne Viola are 
particularly significant. All the scholars mentioned have 
provided evidence that this opposition was massive, 
that it took many forms (active and passive), and that 
oppositional attitudes to the regime were spreading 
throughout all strata of Ukrainian society, including 
the republic's Communist nomenklatura. Kul'chyts'kyi 
reached an interesting conclusion (although one 
which has yet to be additionally substantiated) that 
Stalin turned the Ukrainian SSR into the epicenter of 
repression, because of his fears of opposition from the 
Kharkiv-based Communist apparat and its potential as 
a catalyst for a crisis that “could transform from a red 
one into a blue-and-yellow one, and exploit its border 
status and constitutional rights to effect a separation 
from Moscow.”35
The effect of the Stalinist “Revolution from 
Above” on the political loyalty of the Ukrainian SSR's 
population, the growth of anti-Soviet sentiment in its 
largest demographic (the peasantry), their anticipation 
of a coming war in which the USSR would lose, the 
increasingly nationalistic nature of these sentiments, and 
the Stalin regime's repressive actions against the bearers 
of such sentiments are the subject of a series of my own 
publications.36 I advance the hypothesis that there is a 
possible connection between the Holodomor and the 
strategic military planning of the Soviet leadership, in 
particular with regards to the preparation of the USSR 
for a future war. Elements of such a preparation would 
have included not only the modernization of the state's 
military-industrial complex, but also the “political 
preparation of the rear-guard.” It is suggested that 
this preparation was achieved by way of propaganda 
campaigns and by a purge of disloyal elements that could 
be dangerous during wartime. The obvious disloyalty to 
the Communist regime of a significant segment of the 
Ukrainian peasantry could well have prompted Stalin to 
employ famine as an instrument of physical liquidation 
of a potential “fifth column.”
above-mentioned works), “Opir selianstva sutsil'nii kolektyvizatsii,” 
Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 2 (2004) and others.
35. S. Kul'chitskii, Pochemu on nas unichtozhal? Stalin i 
ukrainskii Golodomor (Kyiv, 2007), 89.
36. Works by L.V. Hrynevych include: “Stalins'ka ‘revoliutsiia 
z hory' ta holod 1933 iak factory politizatsii ukrains'koi spil'noty,” 
Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, 5 (2003); “Pro odyn taiemnyi proiekt 
stalins'koho kerivnytstva kintsia 1920-kh rr.,” Problemy istorii 
Ukrainy: fakty, sudzhennia, poshuky. Mizhvidomchyi zbirnyk nau- 
kovykh prats', vyp. 11 (Kyiv, 2004); “‘Test na politychnu loial'nist'': 
suspil'no-politychni nastroi naselennia USRR v umovakh ‘voiennoi 
tryvohy' 1927 roku,” Problemy istorii Ukrainy: fakty, sudzhennia, 
poshuky. Mizhvidomchyi zbirnyk naukovykh prats', vyp. 13 (Kyiv, 
2005); “Tsina stalins'koi ‘revoliutsii zhory': ukrains'ke selianstvo v 
ochikuvannii na viinu,” Problemy istorii Ukrainy: fakty, sudzhennia, 
poshuky. Mizhvidomchyi zbirnyk naukovykh prats', vyp. 16, ch. 1 
(Kyiv, 2007).
The question of identifying the perpetrators of the 
genocidal crimes in Ukraine is becoming a matter of 
increasingly active interest. Some researchers, clearly 
prompted by subjective factors, ascribe guilt exclusively 
to the person of Stalin, or to the leader and his closest 
entourage (Molotov and Kaganovich). This approach 
has not gained much acceptance by Ukraine's scholars, 
among whom there is a discernible trend of broadening 
the responsibility for the mass killings beyond Stalin to 
the entire Party-state power structure, as well as to the 
rank-and-file executors of the genocide, for example, the 
local activists.
Positions taken by the upper echelon of the USSR 
and the Ukrainian SSR during the Holodomor have been 
examined by Valerii Vasyl'iev,37 Yurii Shapoval,38 and 
Hennadii Iefymenko.39 Mykola Doroshko's monograph 
on the Ukrainian SSR's Party-state nomenklatura 
includes a special analysis of this question. In particular, 
Doroshko concludes that “the leadership of the republic 
failed to stand up to the dictates of the center, and actually 
became a leading force in the execution of a policy that 
cost the Ukrainian people a multitude of victims.”40
In recent years, articles have been published and 
dissertations defended devoted to the analysis of the 
functioning of various governmental structures in the 
conditions of collectivization and famine, including the 
organs of state security, internal affairs, and the justice 
ministry.41 In addition, Ukrainian researchers have made 
an effort to understand the phenomenon of participation 
in repressive campaigns in the countryside by particular 
groups, such as members of poor peasants' committees 
(komnezamy) and militant atheists' associations.42
37. V. Vasyl'iev, “Tsina holodnoho khliba. Polityka kerivnytstva 
SRSR i URSR v 1932-1933, in Komandyry velykoho holodu: Poizdky 
V. Molotova i L. Kahanovycha v Ukrainu ta na Pivnichnyi Kavkaz, 
1932-1933, eds. V. Vasyl'iev and Iu. Shapoval (Kyiv, 2001).
38. Iu. Shapoval, “III konferentsiia KP(b)U: proloh trahedii 
holodu,” in Vasyl'iev and Shapoval, Komandyry velykoho holodu. See 
also Iu. Shapoval, “Holod 1932-1933 rokiv: politychne kerivnytstvo 
USRR i Kreml',” Suchasnist', 6 (2003).
39. H. Iefimenko, “Rol' natsional-komunistiv u holodomori 
1932-1933 rr.,” Problemy istorii Ukrainy: fakty, sudzhennia, poshuky, 
issue 7: Spetsial'nyi (Kyiv, 2003).
40. M. Doroshko, Kompartiino-derzhavna nomenklatura USRR 
u 20—30-ti roky XX stolittia: sotsioistorychnyi analiz (Kyiv, 2004).
41. See V. M. Nikol's'kyi, Represyvna diial'nist' orhaniv 
derzhavnoi bezpeky SRSR v Ukraini (kinets' 1920-kh—1950-ti rr.: Is- 
toryko-statystychne doslidzhennia (Avtoreferat dysertatsii) (Donets'k, 
2003); V. M. Kryvonis, “Sotsial'ni funktsii orhaniv ‘pravoporiadku' v 
period holodomoru 1932-1933 rr. v Ukraini,” Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi 
zhurnal, 1 (2004); and I. V. Subochiev, Diial'nist' orhaniv iustytsii 
Ukrainy v umovakh zdiisnennia polityky kolektyvizatsii na seli (1928-
1933 rr.) (Dnipropetrovs'k, 2006).
42. O.A. Mel'nychuk, Komitety nezamozhnykh selian na 
Podilli (1920-1933 rr.) (Avtoreferat dysertatsii) (Kyiv, 1998); V. O. 
Voloshenko, Komitety nezamozhnykh selian v Donbasi (1920-1933) 
(Avtoreferat dysertatsii) (Donets'k, 2003); T. Ievsieieva, “Diial'nist' 
spilky ‘voiovnychykh bezvirnykiv' Ukrainy pid chas sutsil'noi 
kolektyvizatsii 1929-1933 rr.,” Problemy istorii Ukrainy: fakty, sud-
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However, the issue of “silent witnesses” has not yet been 
adequately addressed.
The effects of the tragedy of 1932-33 are being stud-
ied by Ukrainian scholars primarily in the form of as-
sessments of demographic losses. Alongside studies by 
Russian and Western researchers, such as Robert Con-
quest, Sergei Maksudov (aka Alexander Babyonshev), 
Stephen G. Wheatcroft, and Valentina Zhiromskaia, are 
those of Ukrainian scholars Stanislav Kul'chyts'kyi* 43 and 
Serhii Pyrozhkov.44 Despite the variations in statistical 
methodology, and certain differences in the total number 
of victims, there is general agreement that demographic 
statistics have made it possible to determine, with vary-
ing degrees of accuracy, some indicators of the demo-
graphic catastrophe that occurred in the early 1930s. Py- 
rozhkov, the director of the Institute of Demography and 
Sociological Research at the National Academy of Sci-
ences of Ukraine, calculated that the sum total of direct 
and indirect losses in population in Ukraine amounted to 
4.6 million.45 Kul'chyts'kyi put the figure at between 3 
to 3.5 million.46 Generally speaking, Wheatcroft agrees 
with the latter numbers.47
Researchers have also turned their attention to 
changes in the direction of Soviet nationalities policy, 
the ending of Ukrainianization and the intensification of 
Russification tendencies, and other political shifts and 
transformations that took place in the USSR and the 
Ukrainian SSR after 1932-33. In particular, according to 
Vasyl'iev, “1933 became one of the decisive moments 
in the Sovietization of Ukraine, the strengthening of the 
Stalinist system in the republic, and the intensification 
of the repressiveness of the totalitarian regime.”48 Ukrai-
nian scholars have uniformly stressed the heavy moral 
and psychological impacts of the Holodomor, although 
research on this subject remains a task to be undertaken 
in the future.
zhennia, poshuky. Mizhvidomchyi zbirnyk naukovykhprats', Vyp. 11 
(Kyiv 2004); L.O. Dudka, Spilka voiovnychykh bezvirnykiv v antyre- 
lihiinii propohandi v Ukraini (20-ti-40-vi roky XX st.) (Avtoreferat 
dysertatsii') (Kyiv 2005).
43. S. Kul'chyts'kyi, Demohrafi chni naslidky holodu 1933 r. na 
Ukraini (Kyiv, 1989); S.V. Kul'chyts'kyi and S. Maksudov, “Vtraty 
naselennia Ukrai'ny vid holodu 1933 r.,” Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi 
zhurnal, 2 (1991).
44. S. Pirozhkov, Trudovoi potentsial v demografi cheskom 
izmerenii (Kyiv, 1992), 63; S. Pyrozhkov, “Smertnist' naselennia 
Ukrai'ny ta demohrafichni vtraty v ekstremal'nii sytuatsii,” in Holod 
1946-1947 rokiv v Ukraini: prychyny i naslidky (Kyiv-New York, 
1998), 32, 40.
45. Ekonomicheskie izvestiia (Kyiv), 24 November 2006.
46. S. Kul'chitskii, Pochemu on nas unichtozhal? Stalin i 
ukrainskii Golodomor (Kyiv, 2007), 161-62.
47. S. Uitkroft [S. Wheatcroft], “Suchasne uiavlennia pro 
pryrodu ta riven' smertnosti pid chas holodu 1931-1933 rokiv v 
Ukraini,” in Vasyl'iev and Shapoval, Komandyry velykoho holodu, 
184.
48. V. Vasyl'iev, “Tsina holodnoho khliba,” in Vasyl'iev and
Shapoval, Komandyry velykoho holodu, 173.
Other matters that continue to attract increasing 
scholarly attention in Ukraine include the mechanism of 
the Communist regime's cover-up of the truth about the 
Famine, the effect of the policy of “enforced amnesia” 
on mass consciousness, and the emergence of “historical 
memorylessness.” James Mace described the latter phe-
nomenon as a syndrome characteristic of a post-geno-
cidal society. The subject of official political memori- 
alization of the Holodomor in contemporary Ukraine 
has also been studied by historians.49 Individual scholars 
have assayed comparative studies of the Famine and the 
history of mass killings in other countries, but these have 
yet to become a significant trend in Ukrainian historiog-
raphy. Ukrainian scholars also remain, for all practical 
purposes, outside of current discussions conducted by 
Western historians about the similarities and differences 
between two tragedies that were visited on the population 
of Ukraine in the 20th century—the Jewish Holocaust 
and the Holodomor. However, certain scholars readily 
apply the term “Holocaust” to the events in Ukraine in 
1932-33, something that is characteristic of the works of 
Yurii Mytsyk, Shapoval, and Vadym Zolotar'ov,50 among 
others.
Politicized Interpretations
of the Famine of 1932-1933
In 1990, Marco Carynnyk delivered a presentation 
at the first scholarly conference in Ukraine on the topic 
of the Holodomor, in which he drew attention to the 
emotional content of discussions concerning the famine, 
and underlined the negative influence that this had on 
their conduct. Seventeen years later the situation is 
largely unchanged. Just as a recollection of the Famine 
is traumatic to those who experienced its events, so it ap-
pears to foster an ongoing crisis in Ukraine's historical 
scholarship, to the point of a crisis of identity among 
historians themselves. Treatments of the topic continue 
to be highly politicized, and a significant number of 
Ukrainian scholars appear to be unable to jettison the 
approach, characteristic of the Soviet period, which 
stresses the didactic role of history. The Holodomor has 
also become a topic of significant interest to certain anti-
Semitic and xenophobic writers.
Ethnocentrism in portraying the Famine shows up 
among some Ukrainian scholars who, shunning com-
parative analysis and analogies, strive to view the matter
49. G. Kas'ianov. “Razrytaia mogila: golod 1932-33 godov v 
ukrainskoi istoriografii, politike i massovom soznanii,” Ab Imperio,
3 (2004).
50. For example, see “Ukrains'kyi holokost, politychnyi 
teror, etnichni chytsky (1932-1935)” in Iu. Shapoval; V. Zolotar'ov, 
Vsevolod Balyts kyi: osoba, chas, otochennia (Kyiv, 2002), 181-257; 
and the Ukrains kyi holokost 1932-1933. Svidchennia tykh, khto 




outside a broader historical context. Emphasizing the ex-
clusively national character of the Holodomor, a number 
of them sometimes remain deliberately silent about the 
fact of famine in other parts of the Soviet Union—nota- 
bly Russia—during the early 1930s, while others even 
deny its existence. This ethnocentric approach is further 
marked by the intentional neglect of the problem of the 
participation of some Ukrainians in conducting repres-
sive measures in the countryside and, in its stead, by an 
attempt to demonize the northern neighbor, attributing 
to Russia and Russians a genetic hatred of Ukraine and 
Ukrainians and the establishment of a “linear connec-
tion” between the events of the famine years 1921-1923, 
1932-1933 and 1946-1947. Finally, the accompanying 
construction of stereotypical images of “enemies of the 
Ukrainian people” and “enemies of the Ukrainian na-
tion,” with Russians and Jews usually cast in this role, 
should be mentioned.
Special attention should be paid to publications that 
appear under the banner of scholarly studies, but actually 
send out a xenophobic message and introduce anti-Semi-
tism to a mass consciousness.51 The absolute majority of 
such works in which the theme of inter-ethnic confronta-
tion is highlighted has been produced by the Inter-region-
al Academy of Personnel Management (Ukrainian acro-
nym: MAUP), a non-governmental higher educational 
establishment based in Kyiv. In 2002, a conference titled 
“The Famine of 1932-1933 as an Enormous Tragedy for 
the Ukrainian Nation” was organized under its auspices, 
which some participants used as an opportunity to dem-
onstrate their xenophobia.52 Other conferences organized 
by MAUP have been convened under such anti-Semitic 
titles as “The Jewish-Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 as 
a Prelude to Red Terror and the Ukrainian Famine” in 
200553 and “Punitive Agencies of the Jewish-Bolshevik 
Regime” in 200654 (the latter being expressly identified 
as “a forum on the Holodomor in Ukraine”).
The Famine Researchers' Association has unfortu-
nately also been guilty of provoking inter-ethnic tensions 
through some of its publications. Particularly notable is 
Andrii Kulish's “scientific-publicist” work Genocide.
51. These studies were considered in Per Anders Rudling, “Or-
ganized Anti-Semitism in Contemporary Ukraine: Structure, Influence 
and Ideology, Canadian Slavonic Papers 44, nos. 1-2 (March-June 
2006).
52. The proceedings appeared as Holodomor 1932-1933 
rokiv iak velychezna trahediia ukrains'koho narodu: Materialy 
Vseukrains'oi naukovoi konferentsii. Kyiv, 15 lystopada 2002 r. (Kyiv: 
MAUP, 2003).
53. These proceedings appeared as Ievreis'ko-bil'shovyts'kyi 
perevorot 1917 roku iak peredumova chervonoho teroru ta 
ukrains'kykh holodomoriv: Materialy IV Mizhnarodnoi naukovoi 
konferentsii, 25 lystopada 2005 r. (Kyiv: MAUP, 2006).
54. See “Zvernennia do Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy uchasnykiv
Mizhnarodnoho forumu z Holodomoru v Ukraini ‘Karal'ni orhany
ievreis'ko-bil'shovyts'koho rezhymu',” Personal, 2007, nos. 1, 2.
Famine in 1932-1933. Reasons, Victims, Perpetrators, 
which was published under the auspices of Association.55 
Some of the publications of the Association's regional 
branches are also steeped in xenophobia and anti-Semi-
tism (for example, the proceedings of the 2003 Kharkiv 
conference “The Holodomors in Ukraine: Reasons, Vic-
tims, Perpetrators”56).
An examination of the profile of the authors of such 
odious works regarding collectivization and the Famine 
of 1932-1933 shows that the majority are individuals far 
removed from the historical profession. Politicians form 
one group of authors, while journalists are also a sig-
nificant component. Last but not least, a small number 
of professional historians provide a scholarly veneer to 
these anti-Semitic interpretations of the history of col-
lectivization and the Famine.
A historiographic characterization of the majority of 
xenophobic publications about the Famine of 1932-1933 
is practically impossible: these are works not marked 
by intellectual rigor. The idee fixe of such publications 
is the notion of the “international conspiracy of world 
Jewry,” which, they claim, seized power in Russia and 
Ukraine in 1917. Typical in this regard is the approach 
sketched out in Kulish's Genocide book (see above): 
the Jews of Ukraine in the interwar period are allotted a 
place as the “ruling people,” the Russians are the “people 
of the lash,” and Ukrainians are “people-victims.” The 
authors of anti-Semitic publications see the reasons for 
the Famine in the “genetic hatred” of Jews toward Ukrai-
nians; in the ill-intentioned aspirations to depopulate 
Ukrainian territory for its settlement by “suitable ethnic 
material”; and in “revenge” against Ukrainians for “his-
torical wrong-doings” suffered by the Jews—from the 
destruction of the Khazar kaganate to the pogroms of 
the Khmel'nyts'kyi era and the Independence struggle of 
1917-1920. Another not uncommon explanation for the 
cause of the Holodomor is given as an attack by Judaism 
on Orthodoxy.
It is common for many anti-Semitic publications 
to twist and/or openly falsify historical facts, employ-
ing various manipulative methods to strengthen ethnic 
hostilities. We see, for example, the publication of lists 
of Jewish administrators and representatives of security 
structures, the attribution of a Jewish background to all 
the perpetrators of the Holodomor and the deliberate po-
liticization of the question of using [in Ukrainian] the 
ethnonym “zhyd” rather than “ievrei.” The attempts to 
establish causal links between the Holodomor and Ho-
locaust tragedies—occasionally even with an indirect
55. Andrii Kulish, Henotsyd. Holodomor 1932-1933: Prychyny, 
zhertvy, zlochyntsi, 3d rev. ed. (Kharkiv-Kyiv: Asotsiatsiia doslid- 
nykiv holodomoru v Ukraini, 2001).




exoneration for the destruction of the Jews during the 
Second World War—seem quite shocking. 57
These amateurish authors can scarcely be 
considered the creators of an academic historical 
narrative. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for 
the writings of individual professional historians who 
strive to present various ideological approaches in the 
form of “historical schemes,” buttressed by supporting 
scholarly argumentation. In this respect one could and 
should pay attention to the concept of “Jewish statehood 
in Ukraine” put forward by the doctor of historical 
sciences Serhii Bilokin' in his presentation “Terror by 
Famine: Reflections about the Character of Statehood 
in Ukraine in the 1920s-1930s” at the international 
scholarly conference “The Holodomor of 1932-1933: 
Its Major Participants and Mechanics of Realization,” 
held in Kyiv in 2003.58 Bilokin' cites the following as 
the main reason for the genocide of the Ukrainians: (1) 
lack of independence; (2) the non-Ukrainian character 
of the authorities; (3) Communist Party activities.59 He 
especially concentrates his attention on the question of 
the “un-Ukrainian character of state authority,” which 
then segues into a discussion about the “large” and “even 
crucial” role of Jewry in the social-political developments 
that took place on the territory of Ukraine during the first 
third of the twentieth century. The method suggested by 
Bilokin' to personify the concept of “Jewish statehood 
in Ukraine” was partially realized by Kyiv University 
Professor V. Yaremenko in his 2006 MAUP-published 
work, Just Who Carried Out the Genocide of the 
Ukrainians?60
The Ukrainian intelligentsia expressed its negative 
attitude to displays of xenophobia in a “Statement” (of 
principle) published in 2005 in the journal Krytyka.61 All 
the same, this comes in the face of the institutionalization 
of “scholarly centers” around which the authors of anti-
Semitic writings group themselves, the launching of 
accompanying “scientific-organizational” and publishing
57. For example, ibid, pp. 3-4 provides the following citation: 
“This national minority [Jews—L.H.] wielded absolute power in the 
Moscow empire over the course of 20 years, and during the following 
10 years their influence, while not commanding, was quite consider-
able. This is particularly emphasized by the authors of the preface to 
the collection of conference materials—it may be seen as absurd or 
unbelievable, but this is a fact: Ukrainians were saved from complete 
annihilation in the 1930s and 1940s by the coming of the National 
Socialists to power in Germany and the Second World War.”
58. S. I. Bilokin', “Teror holodom: mirkuvannia pro kharakter 
derzhavnosti v Ukraini 1920-1930 rokiv,” in Holodomor 19321933 
rokiv: osnovni diiovi osoby i mekhanizmy zdiisnennia: Materialy 
Druhoi Mizhnarodnoi naukovoi konferentsii. Kyiv, 28 lystopada 2003 
r. (Kyiv: MAUP, 2004).
59. Ibid, 11.
60. V. Iaremenko, Tak khto zh zdiisnyv henotsyd ukraintsiv? 
(Kyiv: MAUP, 2006).
61. “Proty ksenofobii, za ievropeis'ku Ukrainu. Zaiava
ukrains'koi intelihentsii,” Krytyka, 6 (2005).
activity (i.e., the staging of scientific conferences, a 
growth in the number of newspaper and journal articles, 
the appearance of brochures and even books) and the 
occasional inclusion of that sort of article on the pages 
of serious academic publications. Regrettably, this is 
leading to the danger of xenophobic and anti-Semitic 
interpretations of the Famine of 1932-1933 establishing 
some legacy in the realm of Ukrainian scholarship.
Soon after Ukraine's independence was declared, the 
country's Communist Party was banned, and for a time 
Communist interpretations of the Famine were excluded 
from the public arena. This did not last long, however, 
since the Party was reinstated as an officially-sanctioned 
organization in late 1993. Over the last few years the 
attention paid by Communist historians to the Famine 
of 1932-1933 has grown considerably. Items noting 
the Communist versions of the causes of the Famine 
appear regularly on the pages of the Communist press. 
Several brochures on the topic have seen the light of 
day, including L. Hladkaia, L. Duz' and V. Sydorenko's 
1933: Holodomor??? and G. Tkachenko's The Myth of 
the Holodomor—the Discovery of the Manipulators of 
the Mind.62
The authors of works upholding the Communist 
understanding of the Famine are for the most part 
Communist Party functionaries, some of them with only 
a basic history education. There is also a small circle of 
generally older scholars and lecturers (historians, jurists, 
philosophers) versed in Communist ideology and well- 
known for their public pronouncements in defense of the 
Soviet past. A few are highly-placed academics, such as 
Petro Tolochko, a specialist in medieval history. Exclusive 
interviews with Tolochko discussing the Famine were 
published in the Party newspaper Komunist and the 
tabloid Bul'var Gordona.63 They were republished in the 
Communist press and some Russian history websites 
and cited as an independent expert viewpoint.
Common threads running through Communist 
publications include an obstinate ignorance of the 
sources that have emerged in the field over the last 
fifteen years and a total lack of substantial analysis of 
important contemporary studies published in Ukraine 
since independence. Works by Western or other scholars 
are judged a priori as hostile and malevolent—writings 
motivated by the desire of “America and the West” to 
ruin the Ukrainian-Russian alliance. The Communist 
evaluation of eyewitness accounts of the Holodomor
62. L. Gladkaia, L. Duz', V. Sydorenko, 1933: golodomor??? 
(Odesa, 2005); G.S. Tkachenko, Mif o golodomore—izobretenie 
manipuliatorov soznaniem (Kyiv, 2006).
63. “Vedushchii spetsialist drevnemu Kievu akademik Petr 
Tolochko: ‘My uzhe dogovorilis' do togo, chto Iisus Khristos byl 
shchirym ukraintsem, gutsulom.'” Bul'var Gordona, 10 (46) (2006); 




published today in Ukraine is extremely emotional 
and offensive. The authors label such testimonials as 
“aggressive, unsubstantiated attacks” on the Communist 
Party.
The conceptual scheme adhered to by Communist 
historians was formulated by “official” Soviet historians 
in the late 1980s, when the CPSU finally lifted its long-
standing ban on mentioning the Famine at all. They 
recognize the very fact of famine, but categorically deny 
its artificial nature and anti-Ukrainian (genocidal) thrust. 
Characteristically, there are efforts not only to minimize 
the Famine losses in Ukraine, with the Communists 
giving a figure of approximately 700,000 dead, but also 
to impose on Ukrainian society a concept of the 1932-
1933 Famine as an “ordinary event,” one of many that 
took place in the lands of the former Russian Empire. 
One author, writing in this vein in Komunist, states: 
“Just think—a famine! In the nineteenth century alone, 
there were forty years of famine or semi-famine in tsarist 
Russia.”64 When writing the word Famine, Communist 
authors generally put the word in quotation marks or 
affix the epithet “so-called.” They also downplay the 
significance of the 1930s tragedy by suggesting that 
famine rages in present-day Ukraine, with the number of 
its victims reaching as high as 5.5 million.
As for causes, those proposed closely follow the 
historical line of the Stalinist Short Course. Trotskyist and 
kurkul (Ukrainian for “kulak”) wreckers are identified as 
culprits, with the latter shouldering most of the blame. 
They are said to have sabotaged collectivization efforts, 
hidden away enormous quantities of grain, slaughtered 
animals, and to have been so outraged with the Soviet 
regime that they starved their families and themselves 
to death. Drought is also commonly given as a cause 
of the Famine. Other themes that commonly appear in 
Communist accounts include the efforts of the Communist 
Party to provide assistance to those afflicted by famine as 
well as the characterization of the Famine of 1932-1933 
as a “common sorrow for all Soviet peoples.”
Among the many publications that represent a 
neo-Communist version of Famine history, particular 
attention should be paid to an article written by Professor 
Valerii Soldatenko. Named “The Hungry Thirty- 
Third: Subjective Thoughts on Objective Process,” it 
was published in the newspaper Dzerkalo tyzhnia. It 
outlines a concept that contains a veiled justification 
of the Famine as a response on the part of the Soviet 
government, “provoked by the capitalist world,” to 
prepare for a future war, thus directly linking the radical 
measures undertaken by the Stalinist leadership in the
64. D. Derych, “Pravda pro ‘Holodomor' 33-ho, Komunist, 49 
(246) (1998).
agricultural sphere to the Soviet victory over Germany in 
the Second World War.65
In recent years the Communist historians' activity 
has been increasingly intense, and their pressure on 
scholars who research Famine-related issues has been 
quite aggressive. In early 2007, V. Shekhovtsev, a 
historian and lawyer who had worked in the Public 
Prosecutor's office for 35 years, famous today for his 
active defense of Stalin, addressed V. Kalinichenko, 
head of the Ukrainian history department of Kharkiv 
National University, in an open letter to the socialist 
newspaper Dosvitni vohni, which summoned him to 
a public hearing at which the professor would act on 
behalf of the prosecution, while Shekhovtsev himself 
would take the side of the defense.66 Shekhovtsev had 
been provoked by the publication of Capital of Despair: 
The 1932-1933 Famine in the Kharkiv Region as Seen 
by Eyewitnesses, to which Kalinichenko had written 
the preface.67 In his letter, the jurist threatened that the 
professor had exposed himself to libel suits brought by 
the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of Stalin, 
Molotov, Kaganovich, Kosior, Postyshev, etc. He also 
called upon Kalinichenko to come forth with precise, 
extensive medical documentation to prove the wrongful 
deaths of every purported victim.
Conclusion
Ukrainian historical scholarship has traveled a 
difficult path in shedding light on the matter of the 
Famine of 1932-1933. This was almost guaranteed by 
the very difficulties of Ukraine's historical development 
process. Under conditions in which the Communist 
Party monopolized authority and ideology, Ukrainian 
historical science stepped forward as an active instrument 
for the realization of a state policy of “imposed 
amnesia.” It stayed silent and denied even the very fact 
of the tragedy of the Holodomor. After the fall of the 
Soviet Union, Ukrainian state independence created 
favorable conditions for a truthful accounting and deeper 
understanding of the events of 1932-1933.
In spite of an unstated policy of “inert ignorance” 
toward Holodomor topics persistently followed by post-
Communist Ukraine's higher leadership, Ukrainian 
scholars made considerable strides toward piecing 
together an outline of the facts of the Famine of 1932-
1933, establishing an understanding of its causes and 
effects, and elucidating the genocidal essence of this
65. Valerii Soldatenko, “Holodnyi trydtsiat' tretii. Sub'iektyvni 
dumky pro ob'iektyvni protsesy,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia, 28 June 2003.
66. I. T. Shekhovtsev, “Vri, no znai meru! Otkrytoe pis'mo 
doktoru istoricheskikh nauk, professoru, zaveduiushchemu kafedroi 
istorii Ukrainy Khar'kovskogo natsional'nogo universiteta im. Karaz- 
ina Kalenichenko V. V.,” Dosvitni vohni, 2 (2007): 265.
67. T. Polishchuk, ed., Stolytsia vidchaiu: holodomor 1932-
1933 rr. na Kharkivshchyni vustamy ochevydtsiv (Kharkiv, 2006).
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crime committed by the Stalin regime. The field of 
Holdomor studies in contemporary Ukraine is extremely 
diverse, and the research being conducted clearly 
demonstrates a sea change in both the outlook and level 
of professionalism among scholars dealing with the 
topic. Also evident is the politicization of the Famine 
issue, which is revealed in particular by the existence 
of its ethnocentric, anti-Semitic and Communist 
interpretations. Despite certain achievements, Ukrainian 
historical study still remains insufficiently integrated 
into the global scholarly realm. A sociocultural inertia— 
approaching the sphere of Ukrainian history with an 
assumption of self-sufficiency—is clearly manifested 
by the fact that scholarly discussions concerning 
Holodomor issues taking place in the West very often 
remain generally unnoticed in Ukraine.
In October 2007, at a Fullbright conference in 
Kyiv, Dr. Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak noted that she 
felt modern Ukrainians were too prone to a negative 
evaluation of today's reality and tended to picture 
everything darker than it actually was. I would not like 
to serve as proof of Dr. Bohachevsky's statement, so in 
summing up my overview of contemporary Ukrainian 
historiography on the Famine of 1932-1933, I would like 
to state that in spite of the difficulties and arguments, the 
research process is proceeding and even accelerating. Its 
prospects, which I fully expect to be realized, give one 
hope.
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